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Simon Saunders and David Wallace are attempting to use a modified form of David 
Lewis's analysis of personal fission to support the thought that prior to undergoing 
Everett branching an informed subject can be uncertain about which outcome s/he will 
observe. I argue that a central assumption of this seductive idea is questionable despite 
appearing innocuous and that at the very least further argument is needed in support of it. 
 
Simon Saunders and David Wallace suggest that a subject about to knowingly undergo branching in the Everett 
multiverse can be understood to be uncertain about what s/he will experience if David Lewis's view of  the 
transtemporal identity of persons through fission is modified (Saunders and Wallace 2007, Wallace 2005a: sec. 
3.4, 2005b:14; Lewis 1976). Wallace has what can appear to be an independent argument for pre-measurement 
uncertainty in making intelligible Hugh Everett III's ‘relative state’ interpretation of quantum mechanics; it is an 
argument from linguistic interpretative charity. I shall not be challenging that argument here but I shall have 
something to say about it in relation to the Lewis-based idea. Wallace’s 2005 papers only make brief mention of 
this idea but it is the focus of attention of Saunders’ and Wallace’s (2007). 
Lewis used the world-tube (or ‘worm’) version of transtemporal identity which takes a persisting object 
to be an aggregate of temporal parts or ‘stages’. For personal identity, the cement which holds the aggregate of 
person-stages together is an ‘R-relation’ between temporally juxtaposed stages. In a case of genuine personal 
fission some temporal stage S at time T has multiple successors at a later time T+ which are all R-related to S. 
Independently of any concern about Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics there has been discussion of 
the possibility of such personal fission in imaginary cases of partial brain transplants and malfunctioning 
teleporters, dealt with at length by Derek Parfit (1984). Lewis argued that each of these multiple successors can 
be understood to be a stage of a distinct persisting person who has their origin prior to T and who persists to at 
least T+. The histories of these distinct persons thus overlap prior to fission. The stage S is a stage of many 
persons, one for every downstream branch of the ‘world-tree’ of which the pre-fission segment is the trunk. 
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Putting this idea into the context of a quantum measurement in Everett's multiverse where a measurement of 
the spin of a particle relative to some arbitrarily given  spatial direction is made, there are as many observers as 
there are downstream branches. In realistic Everettian terms that means that there will be a vast and 
indeterminate number of observers. However, leaving aside very low amplitude branches, the observers will 
partition post-measurement into a set of observers seeing spin-up and and a set of observers seeing spin-down. It 
will do no harm to simplify this setup for the sake of clarity. So imagine the idealised situation where there is a 
single fission into two branches with no subsequent branching. What is important here is tracking identity so 
we can set aside the quantum-mechanical amplitude. 
Our observer, Hydra, is attempting to believe the Everett interpretation an is assumed to be fully informed 
about the relevant aspects of her quantum-mechanical predicament. She has prepared her Stern-Gerlach apparatus 
at time T for a measurement of the residual x-spin of a silver atom and the result is going to be, according to 
Everett, that at the later time T+ Hydra will have two ‘successors’ one of whom will see the result UP and the 
other the result DOWN. On the Lewisian analysis of fission there are in this scenario two observers who we can 
label HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Following Lewis, these Hydras have distinct stages at T+, where the 
outcomes UP and DOWN are respectively seen, and common stages up to and including T. Saunders’ and 
Wallace’s claim is that at T each of the Hydras can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I do not 
know which ’. Thus each Hydra at T is subject to ignorance about which person she is and this justifies the 
assertion that each is uncertain about what she is going to see.  
The idea can be seductive but we need to think carefully how people are understood to refer to themselves on 
the world-tube version of transtemporal identity in order to unmask a problem. Firstly, let’s look at what 
Saunders and  Wallace have to say in support of the idea. Here is Wallace : 
 
According to Lewis’s proposal, if at some stage in my future I am to undergo branching into two 
copies, then (timelessly) there are two people, and my current (pre-branching) person stages are 
shared by both of them. 
On the additional assumption that the correct referent of utterances and of mental states is a 
person at a time (rather than a person-stage) it follows that I am genuinely ignorant of my post-
branching future. For when I say ‘who will I become’ that statement should actually be ascribed 
to two versions of me (one of whom will, post splitting, become each version of me). Since (as a 
consequence of any physicalist approach to mind) any thoughts and beliefs I have at a time 
supervene on my person-stage at that time and since the two versions of me share all person-stages 
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prior to branching it follows that it is impossible for the two versions of me to resolve their 
ignorance. 
What are they ignorant about ? Not of course any propositional knowledge, but something 
more indexical (2005a, sec. 3.4) 
 
This is much too quick because we need to know more about how an utterance of ‘I’ refers to the utterer for 
the idea to be coherent, especially as we’re in a novel situation where a single vocal event is to be understood to 
express the utterances of more than one person. It’s not what Wallace dubs the ‘additional assumption’ that it is 
persons who utter rather than person-stages which is the problem. It is the lack of any hint of a mechanism 
whereby each of Wallace’s dual utterers secures an indexical reference to themself by the use of ‘I’ prior to 
fission. Wallace covers this lacuna by alluding to the ‘ascription’ of each utterance to their respective utterer but, 
as I shall explain, this idea of ascription trades on a mechanism of indexical reference which is unproblematic in 
non-branching contexts but which is inapplicable to branching. 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s recent paper on the idea attempts to correct this oversight. They make explicit the 
assumption they need about the reference of utterances of ‘I’ : 
 
… one might make a case for a variety of semantic rules, but the one we are interested in is this: 
the word ‘I’ refers to the speaker of any sentence in which it occurs. In the non-branching case, it 
is a banality. (2007 :?? , their emphasis) 
 
Discussion of the status of this assumption is going to be central to the point I have to make against 
Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea so I shall give the semantic rule a name : 
 
I’s Right: The word ‘I’ refers to the speaker in any sentence in which it occurs. 
 
As I shall show in a moment the adoption of this rule is not actually ‘a banality’ in the non-branching case 
but even if it were we should surely be suspicious of the assumption that it would be equally banal in the novel 
metaphysical predicament of Lewisian overlap. Saunders and Wallace are making a strong claim. They are 
claiming that they can explain how a subject believing Everett can be ignorant of the outcome of a quantum 
measurement such as Hydra’s prior to making it. Such a claim ought not to rest on applying what appears to be 
an obvious truism to a novel situation without further ado.  
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I’s Right is not banal in the non-branching case when the world-tube metaphysics of transtemporal identity 
is adopted for the following reason. On the ‘endurance’ view of transtemporal identity a persisting object is 
‘wholly present’ at all times in its history. The world-tube view denies this, taking a persisting object to be its 
history, an aggregate of temporal parts. On the endurance view a subject is wholly present at any time at which 
s/he makes an indexical reference, as is any environmental object to which s/he refers. As both referer and referent 
are wholly present at the time the reference is made there seems to be no problem in principle about there being 
an indexical relation between them at that time. In contrast, on the world-tube view it is only temporal parts of 
the referer and the referent which are present at the time the reference is made. 
There is no real difficulty for the world-tube theorist here, an account is readily available, but when that 
account is given it becomes clear that it only applies to non-branching cases. It cannot be applied to branching 
cases. To see why, consider this. An utterance is made at a time by a person and the utterance is tokened by an 
event, usually vocal, which is associated with a stage which is a temporal part of that person's body according to 
world-tube theory. Suppose that in a non-branching context René, faced with an apple, says ‘That apple is 
green’ at time T. At time T a temporal stage of René's body is associated with a vocal event which is 
understood to be a token of ‘That apple is green’. At time T there is an apple-stage which is appropriately 
related to the body-stage associated with the vocal event and that apple-stage is a temporal part of a single apple. 
That's how René succeeds in indexically referring to an apple: there is an appropriate juxtaposition of the 
utterance token associated with a stage of René's body and a stage of the indicated apple. The idea brings to 
mind the image of a chromosome pair, touching in the middle: the world-tube subject successfully refers to a 
world-tube object at a time because stages of each world-tube are in an appropriate relation to each other at that 
time. 
Now go on to the non-branching case where René says ‘This is my body’, an unusual statement, but we 
would generally take it to be perfectly intelligible. He might stub a finger at his chest for gestural emphasis but 
that would be strictly unnecessary, René’s use of ‘this’ would be enough to indicate the body in question. That 
is because the site of the token of ‘this’ is a body-stage which is a stage of a unique world-tube body. Like 
René’s reference to the apple, his reference to his body picks out a unique world-tube referent. But what of 
René’s reference to himself ? Here again the reference has to go via his body, there is nothing else which can 
provide evidence of  which person René is, as is illustrated by everyday expressions such as ‘I’m over here !’. 
For René’s utterance of  ‘This is my body’ to be true the body picked out by his use of ‘this’ has to be the 
body belonging to the person who is making the whole utterance. Clearly, the body-stage which is the site of 
the whole utterance is the very same as, or at least contains, the body-stage which is the site of the utterance of 
‘this’ and, thanks to the non-branching context, that body-stage is part of a unique body of one person, René. 
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However, things do not go so smoothly for Lewis’s world-tube view of personal identity in branching 
contexts. To spell out why, let us return to the case of the Hydras. According to the Saunders/Wallace proposal 
both HydraUP and HydraDOWN at time T, prior to fission, can truly say ‘I am either HydraUP or 
HydraDOWN but I don't know which’. Both the Hydras say this severally at the same time since a single 
utterance token tokens two utterances, one made by HydraUP and the other made by HydraDOWN. Saunders 
and Wallace require that the Hydras are able to use ‘I’ in the everyday way in which we understand it, so that 
HydraUP refers to HydraUP when she uses ‘I’ and HydraDOWN’s ‘I’ refers to HydraDOWN. That must imply 
that both the Hydras can successfully indexically refer to their own bodies, since, as we saw with René, bodies 
are all we have to go on in determining which utterance of ‘I’ refers to which person. 
But HydraUP and HydraDOWN cannot each indexically refer to her own body via an utterance of ‘This is 
my body’ which has a single token sited in a single body-stage at time T prior to branching. Because that 
single body-stage is common to the world-tube bodies of both HydraUP and HydraDOWN. Why should the 
‘this’ in HydraUP’s utterance of ‘This is my body’ be understood to refer to HydraUP’s body rather than to 
HydraDOWN’s ? There is no reason. And if neither of the Hydras can secure reference to their own bodies then 
neither can secure reference to herself via an utterance of ‘I’. 
Further elaboration of Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea may help to make this point clearer. According to them 
the Hydra setup involves two apparatuses. Prior to branching those two apparatuses share temporal stages. So 
prior to measurement HydraUP sees ApparatusUP, the apparatus which is going to display the result UP, and 
HydraDOWN sees ApparatusDOWN. But not everthing in the Hydras’ pre-measurement environment inhabits 
the proposed two worlds. Events and temporal stages of sufficiently short duration are common to both worlds. 
Thus if HydraUP and HydraDOWN see a lightening flash outside their respective laboratory windows prior to 
measurement then they both refer to one and the same lightening flash even though they each refer, supposedly, 
to numerically distinct apparatuses and windows. 
An utterance of ‘I’ is not an instantaneous event but it is an episode of sufficiently short duration not to be 
involved in branching in the case before us. And as I explained above we would ordinarily take an utterance of 
‘I’ to refer to the utterer by way of being associated with the simultaneous body-stage of the person making the 
utterance if we adopt the world-tube metaphysics of transtemporal identity. But any supposed separate 
simultaneous utterances of ‘I’ prior to measurement made buy HydraUP and HydraDOWN are associated with 
one and the same body-stage simultaneous with those utterances, just as there is one and the same lightening 
flash outside their respective windows. And that one body-stage is common to the bodies of both HydraUP and 
HydraDOWN. So again we see that there is no mechanism wherby HydraUP and HydraDOWN can refer 
unambiguously to their own bodies prior to measurement. 
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What is emerging here is that an utterance of ‘I’ in Lewisian contexts of multiple utterance cannot  
straightforwardly be assumed to refer to the utterer. The semantic rule I’s Right cannot be adopted without 
further ado. It would not be good enough to say that this points to exactly the ignorance for which Saunders and 
Wallace want to argue because the breakdown of indexical reference which I have described simply makes the 
Hydras’ pre-measurement statements of ‘I am either HydraUP or HydraDOWN but I don’t know which’ 
unintelligible. Such an utterance would be as unintelligible as an utterance of ‘That is green’ in a context 
lacking any basis for a mechanism whereby the use of ‘that’ involved an indexical reference to a specific object. 
The objection to Saunders’ and Wallace’s idea, then, is that it requires the semantic rule I’s right which 
makes a claim about reference but no account of how that reference is secured is given even though we would 
expect such an account in non-branching contexts. Is it reasonable that the authors should simply insist that 
HydraUP and HydraDOWN can each successfully refer to hereself in the novel context of Lewisian overlap and 
not give any explanation of how this is possible? There may be a hint of recognition of the need for such an 
explanation when Saunders and Wallace write : 
 
Is it to be objected that thoughts or utterances have an irreducibly local significance ? We may 
grant the point that their tokenings are purely local events - and as such, indeed, are identical - but 
the content of thoughts and utterances is another question. On even the most timid forms of 
externalism, or functionalism for that matter, meanings are context-dependent. The sentences 
produced pre-branching are likely to play different semantic roles for each person subsequently, and 
likewise their component terms. 
This point suggests wide lattitude when it comes to the context-dependence of personal 
pronouns. (2007 :??) 
 
The suggestion here would seem to be that HydraUP’s and HydraDOWN’s separate simultaneous utterances 
of ‘I’ can each be understood to refer to the ascribed speaker in virtue of the ‘context’ in which they are uttered, 
where that context is taken to include the whole histories of the Hydras’ bodies. But the appeal to semantic 
externalism which is being made to support this needs more explanation. For one thing, any semantic 
dependence is not normally understood to extend into an utterance’s future, semantic externalism as it is is 
generally understood to involve a creature’s past history and environment. For another, even such an ardent fan 
of semantic externalism as Tyler Burge has influentially argued that the content of indexical terms is not 
externally determined (1982 :98). 
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As a fall-back, might Wallace wish to appeal to his linguistic argument for charitable interpretation in order 
to justify the adoption of I’s Right? The argument could be that if we in fact inhabit an Everettian multiverse 
then all utterances of ‘I’ would fail to refer to the utterer on a world-tube view of personal identity and so we had 
better, out of linguistic charity, allow that they do so refer. But this would be to neglect that the world-tube 
view is not the only interpretation of transtemporal identity which can cope with branching. Since 1996 there 
has become available Ted Sider’s ‘stage theory’ which can embrace the idea of continuant identity through 
branching without involving the concept of multiple utterance (Sider, 1996, 2001). According to stage theory 
persons are stages, not aggregates of stages, and so any utterance at a time has a token which is associated with 
the unique body, itself a stage, which is the body of that person at that time. Thus even if we do inhabit an 
Everettian multiverse utterances of ‘I’ can be understood to indexically refer to the utterer by the straightforward 
indexical mechanism of a token of a single utterance being appropriately associated with the body of a single 
person. 
For readers not familiar with it, here is Sider’s idea, which was not itself motivated by concerns about 
branching. Sider adapted Lewis’s concept of modal counterparts to introduce the idea of temporal counterparts. 
According to Lewis I have modal counterparts who are persons with blond hair in various ‘possible worlds’. 
For any one of those modal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation MIGHT HAVE BEEN to 
that person. According to Sider I have past temporal counterparts who scrumped apples. For any one of those 
past temporal counterparts I am not that person but I bear the relation WAS to that person. If I am about to 
make a spin measurement in the Everett multiverse in the manner of Hydra then, according to Sider, I have  
future counterparts who see UP and future counterparts who see DOWN. For any one of those future counterparts 
I am not that person but I bear the relation WILL BE to that person, so I will be a person seeing UP and I will 
be a person seeing DOWN whilst those future counterparts of mine are simultaneously distinct persons (Sider, 
2001 : 201). 
Saunders and Wallace might wish to argue that Siderian transtemporal identity is not suitable if we inhabit 
an Everettian multiverse, that we are forced to accept Lewisian identity and that therefore, out of linguistic 
charity, we should generally interpret utterances of ‘I’ to refer to the utterer even though those utterances would 
be multiple in Lewis’s sense. That would be a substantive argument which would need to be brought into play 
to support Saunders’ and Wallace’s proposal that a modified Lewisian semantics can motivate the idea of 
uncertainty of outcome prior to branching. Furthermore, it would imply that there is a more intimate connection 
between the metaphysics of identity and the argument from linguistic charity than Wallace appears to recognise 
in his writings to date. 
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In sum, the idea that Lewis’s analysis of personal fission can be used to ground a notion of ignorance-based 
uncertainty prior to Everett branching appears to be inadequate unless it can be backed up by more extensive 
arguments than have been given so far. So Saunders’ and Wallace’s claim to have solved the ‘incoherence 
problem’ of the Everett interpretation is premature. They state the incoherence problem as being the idea that the 
Everett interpretation ‘can make no sense of talk of uncertainty’ (2007 :??). Bear in mind that Saunders and 
Wallace (2007) is concerned with establishing pre-measurement uncertainty and that it may be that the Everett 
interpretation can be rendered intelligible by appeal to a concept of post-measurement uncertainty such as Lev 
Vaidman’s (1998). Wallace himself acknowledges such a possibility (2005a, sec. 4.2 ). 2 
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